The study of the effects of institutions suffers from a potential endogeneity problem. This article proposes a strategy for addressing this problem by estimating the motivations for institutional choice directly. It identifies the motivations behind the wording of post-independence constitutions in
French goods and/or to reward French companies with the contracts for infrastructure and investment projects. The second factor is military (Luckham, 1982) . France signed defence and security agreements with many of its former colonies. In certain countries it had military bases. In these countries and others, France was willing to intervene to prevent coups or to support them if they were felt to be in the best interests of France (Ayissi, 1999) . The level of involvement was sporadic but often decisive, with France coming to be known as the gendarme (policeman) of Africa. The third factor is cultural. Here, Ager (2005, p. 58) argues, "France's aim was to maintain privileged relations with former colonies, amongst other means by ensuring that the French language was used, that education was provided in and through French, and that cultural activities through the medium of French were available". Support for the French language is the most visible sign of cultural links. However, Joseph (1976, p. 10) emphasised the importance of France's role in education too: "Entire university and secondary school systems were supplied, from the physical plant to details of curricula, examination systems, teaching materials and personnel regulation".
He concludes "French educational models have become more entrenched during the expansion of the African educational systems since independence" (ibid.).
The final factor is personal. French influence was underpinned by a network of personal contacts. These went to the highest level, with presidential involvement a constant factor in policy making in this region. In addition, it involved the influence of particular individuals who were close to the president, notably Jacques Foccart under President de Gaulle and President Pompidou, and Guy Penne and then Jean-Christophe Mitterrand under President Mitterrand. These people enjoyed privileged access to decision-makers in former colonies, but there was also a wider network of officials, experts and advisers who were able to 
Constitutional choice in post-independence Francophone sub-Saharan Africa
To identify the extent to which institutions have been chosen endogenously or exogenously in this region, we focus on the process of constitutional choice.
There is a strong basis for this choice. The standard interpretation of constitutional choice in post-independence Francophone sub-Saharan Africa is well documented. According to this interpretation, at the time of independence the countries in this study adopted "carbon copy constitutions" (Davies, 1963, p. 328) that closely resembled the 1958 French Constitution. This period was marked by a process of constitutional "mimetism" (Conac, 1979, p. 8), ii whereby the French metropolitan model was transposed onto the African context. For some writers, these constitutions were "a set of alien rules" that had usually been written in Europe and were handed down from on high (Mbaku, 2003, p. 112) .
For others, these constitutions were "imposed" but for historical and cultural reasons, namely the historically dominant position of France and the political culture and experience of the African leaders (Glélé, 1980, p. 33) .
Following this period of seemingly explicit constitutional borrowing, the standard interpretation indicates that African countries then started to adopt a more indigenous constitutional model. For some observers, this process began in the early 1960s when countries started to adopt personalised presidential rule and one-party states (Le Vine, 1997, p. 187) . For others, the process began in the mid-1960s and particularly the 1970s when countries adopted marxist-style constitutions. For example, Conac (1979, p. 16 ) talks of the "Africanisation" of constitutions during this period, while Reyntjens (1991, p. 51) identifies "25 years of innovations and experiments". Perhaps unsurprisingly, writers more or less explicitly identify domestic political preferences as being responsible for changing constitutional choices during this time. So, Glélé (1980, p. 32) argues that there was an "acculturation" of the French model, with countries adapting it in ways that "responded to their own socio-political and economic realities". For his part, Le Vine (1997, p. 188) (1991, p. 51) . Cabanis and Martin (2005, p. 357) speak of a process of "isomorphism" whereby the constitutions of the 1990s "are closer than ever to the model belonging to the former colonial power". A doyen of constitutional studies in this region, Jean du Bois de Gaudusson (2009, p. 47) , encapsulates the standard wisdom in the following way: "Many basic laws adopted at the time of independence were mirror texts of the constitutions in operation in the northern hemisphere and more particularly in the former colonial powers … [S]omewhat forgotten in the 1970s and 1980s … these [texts] were resurgent in the 1990s with the beginning of the process of democratic transition". Thus, external influences are considered to be dominant once again.
Thus, identifying the motivations behind constitutional choice in postindependence sub-Saharan Africa provides an appropriate case for examining the extent to which institutions have been chosen endogenously or exogenously.
While constitutional choice is a matter for sovereign domestic actors, there are good reasons to believe that the wording of post-independence constitutions in this region may have been largely the result of direct or indirect French influence. If this were the case, then we could conclude that constitutions were chosen exogenously and, therefore, we would be well placed to determine the effect of institutions on post-independence outcomes.
Research design
This study aims to identify and explain the 'Frenchness' of post-independence Francophone sub-Saharan African constitutions in 15 countries in that region.
The study covers the period from the point of independence to 2010 inclusive. Constitutions consist of those documents that either: (1) Thus, there is always the potential for the 'Frenchness' of constitutions to vary from one country to another at any given time. Moreover, even though the number of constitutional moments varies across the set of countries, Table 1 shows that there is also the potential for considerable variation within any given country over time. It proved impossible to gather a small number of constitutional documents. could have routinely chosen the specific terms and maximise the likelihood that they have chosen a peculiarly French constitutional term. In these ways, the eight words and phrases aim to capture the relative 'Frenchness' of any given constitution. The lower the level of 'Frenchness', the greater the likelihood that a constitution was chosen endogenously. The greater the level of 'Frenchness', the greater the likelihood that the constitution was imported or imposed on the country in question.
If a constitution includes the specified word or phrase, then it is coded 1. If it does not, then it is coded 0. Therefore, there is a 9-point scale of 'Frenchness', ranging from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 8. It should be stressed that the score does not aim to capture whether countries have adopted a French-style semi-presidential constitution. Table 2 shows that there is variation in the overall frequency of the eight indicators across the set of country years. (Beck and Katz, 1995) . This model is an appropriate way of accounting for contemporaneously correlated panels. In this model the dependent variable is a continuous variable. Model 2 is an ordered probit regression with country-clustered standard errors. In this model the dependent variable is an ordinal variable that can, in theory, range from 0-8.
However, no country records a score of 8. Moreover, only Benin and Senegal record a score of 7 and then for only two years each (1964 and 1965, and 1961 and 1962 respectively) . Therefore, we omit these two observations from Model 2.
Otherwise, Table 4 shows that the distribution of the dependent variable is relatively even. Model 3 is a pooled model with country fixed-effects. Here, the dependent variable is continuous. The Hausman test indicates that this model should be used rather than a random effects model. In Model 3 the HISTORY variable is dropped because it is time-invariant for each country and, therefore, would be perfectly collinear with the fixed effect for that country. Table 4 about here
Results and interpretation
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 5 . The findings are very consistent across the three models. They confirm that the motivations for constitutional choice have been both endogenous and exogenous. For the set of exogenous factors, four variables (AID, HISTORY, IMPORT, and SECURITY) were significant at conventional levels in all three models. However, three of these variables (AID, HISTORY, and IMPORT) returned tiny coefficients and the finding for the HISTORY variable was in the opposite direction to the one that was hypothesised. By contrast, the SECURITY variable had a relatively large coefficient and was in the expected direction. In addition, the PRES variable was highly significant in Model 1 and was in the expected direction with a large coefficient. Even so, it was not significant in the other two models. For the set of endogenous factors, the results were somewhat stronger. In all three Models, two variables (PARTY, and MILITARY) were highly significant at conventional levels. Moreover, they had relatively large coefficients and were in the hypothesised direction. Another variable (POP) returned inconsistent results. It was significant in all three models, but there was a positive relationship between population and 'Frenchness' in two models and a negative relationship in the third model. The GDP variable was not significant in any model. In terms of the control variables, there was strong support for the 1990 variable. This variable was significant, with a large coefficient and in the expected direction in all three models. There was somewhat less support for the 1960 variable, which produced a similar result in only two of the three models. To date, such an interpretation has been based on purely qualitative narratives.
The findings in this article suggest that other research methods might also be used to advance such a claim.
Overall, we must acknowledge that we have only tested for the impact of exogenous French influence. In the 1970s it is clear that certain countries were inspired by Soviet-style single-party constitutions. Moreover, since the beginning of the 1990s countries have, arguably, been shaped by a more diverse set of constitutional influences than merely the French model (Bourgi, 2002, p. 723) . Generally, though, by estimating the motivations for constitutional choice directly we are well placed to proceed to a more informed study of the causal effect of institutions in this region. The results of the first-stage estimation presented above suggests that exogenous motivations were associated with institutional choice. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that institutions may have had at least some independent causal impact. The precise nature of any such impact could now be investigated in the second-stage of a study of postindependence institutions in this region. At the same time, the results also showed that there have been endogenous influences. The second-stage of such a study could now focus directly on the impact of the specific endogenous variables that were identified. For example, what is the process by which increased party competition has generated constitutions that are more 'French'?
The second stage of the research project may still need to employ instrumental variables, natural experiments and equivalent research strategies, but this stage would be more able to proceed in a more focused way because of the first-stage estimation.
Conclusion
We assume that institutions shape political preferences and have a causal effect on political outcomes. However, institutions generally, and constitutions among them, are necessarily preference-induced. If institutions are chosen purely endogenously, then we would have to question the extent to which they have http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank_mm/constitution/constitution.pdf Table 3 Descriptive Madagascar (1960) Mali (1960) Mauritania (1961) Niger (1961) Senegal (1961) Togo ( 1960) 
